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ABSTRACT
Product endorsement is employed by many firms and most stud-
ies have proceeded based on management perspectives and
ignored the strategic effects (or indirect effects). However, as a
non-price competition, product endorsement behaviour’s strategic
effects are valuable to be considered and convenient to be cap-
tured by industrial organisation perspective. So, this paper’s pur-
pose is to reveal the strategic effects of product endorsement by
industrial organisation perspective. First, the results of this paper
show that celebrity endorsement decreases the rival’s benefits.
Second, under a unique endorser, the lower efficiency (measured
by marginal production cost) firm’s celebrity endorsement
improves price difference and dispersion, which are direct effects
of product endorsement. The higher efficiency firm’s endorsement
promotes the producer surplus, consumer surplus and social wel-
fare, which are called indirect effects. Finally, celebrity endorse-
ment has trigger effects. If one firm launches celebrity
endorsement, the rational reaction for its rivals is also to engage
in a similar behaviour. This paper expands the celebrity endorse-
ment issue from management to economics perspective.
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To improve their brand or demand, many firms select product endorsement accord-
ing to consumer-based viewpoint. As MacCrachen (1989) issued, product endorse-
ment is a meaning transfer from the producer to consumer with endorser by
advertising. Product endorsement is extensively discussed in the management field
(Baxter, Ilicic, & Kulczynski, 2015; Ding, Molchanov, & Stork, 2011; Hartmann &
Apaolaza-Ibanez, 2012; Nicolau & Santa-Marıa, 2013; Reed II, Forehand, Puntoni, &
Warlop, 2012), while scant literature about product endorsement in economics exists
(Garthwaite, 2014).
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The purpose of this paper is to offer an analysis about celebrity endorsement from
industrial organisation theory (IOT) perspective for that some valuable conclusions
such as the strategic effects of product endorsement cannot be obtained by manage-
ment framework. What is the difference between management and economics?
Management prefers to investigate micro-individual’s behaviour and its conclusions
depend on psychology heavily. This attribute constrains its efficiency of obtaining the
common and robust conclusions about product endorsement from management or
marketing perspective. Evidences show that the effects of celebrity endorsements vary
across countries and cultures (Winterich, Gangwar, & Grewal, 2018). On the con-
trary, economics has the inherent strength of revealing common and robust econom-
ics behaviours. Furthermore, product endorsement advertising is a major non-price
competition strategy, which also needs more studies from industrial organisation per-
spective. So, this paper proposes to survey the effects of celebrity endorsement on
firms’ competition based on the major hypothesis that product endorsement has both
direct and indirect influences. As a pure theoretical study, all the conclusions are
obtained by statics and comparative static analysis.
Extensive literature about product endorsement in management has been launched
in recent years (Kima, Choeb, & Petrick, 2018; Rahman, 2018). Kim, Choe, & Petrick
(2018) and Shih (2012) addressed the relationship between endorsement strategies
and brand loyalty. Rahman (2018) investigated the positive effects of celebrity
endorsement on brand awareness. Rahman (2018) issued that a firm can build brand
awareness by celebrity endorsement. Erdogan (1999) reviewed the existing literature
about celebrity endorsement. In Erdogan’s reviewing paper, the history of celebrity
endorsement is introduced and some related measures, such as match-up, performer
Q rating are discussed. Miller & Laczniak (2011) discussed the effects of celebrity
endorsement when a star steps out of bounds. Applied to three well-known situa-
tions, Miller and Laczniak (2011) examined the ethical implications of what initially
were good choices for firms, their brands, and their consumers. Shih (2012) showed
that manufacturer brands support high prices and boost those vivid impressions
which are helpful in engendering consumer loyalty. Elberse & Verleun (2012)
addressed the value of celebrity endorsement and find a positive pay-off to a firm’s
decision to sign an endorser, and that endorsements are associated with increasing
sales in an absolute sense and also relative to competing brands. All those studies are
based on management with the conclusion that celebrity endorsement promotes loy-
alty and purchase willingness and consumption promoting effects, which are the dir-
ect influence of endorsement.
There have been quite a few papers about celebrity in economics. For example, by
connecting capital market to product market, Ding, Molchanov & Stork (2011) cap-
tured the influence of celebrity endorsement on stock and they found that endorse-
ments bring technology industry firms with significant positive abnormal returns.
Garthwaite (2014) examined the economic effects of endorsements and found that
celebrity endorsements have demand spillover or business stealing in the publishing
sector. Interestingly, Chung, Timothy, & Kannan (2013) and Popescu (2014) tried to
reveal Economic Value of Celebrity Endorsements. Their studies illustrated that prod-
uct endorsement in management implied economics theory, too. Barone & Jewell
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(2014) declared endorsement creates advertising flexibility. Those studies involve the
indirect effects of celebrity endorsement but they also are not pure economics per-
spective studies in the strict sense because they lack economic theories. Besides, more
and more attentions are paid to B2B or industry sector (Agnihotria, Dingus, Huc, &
Krush, 2016; Mehmet & Clarke, 2016; Pedeliento, Andreinia, Bergamaschia, &
Salob, 2016).
Notice that nearly all the prior research ignored the behaviour of endorser because
they took product endorser as an exogenous variable or only given celebrity endorse-
ment to analyse its effects on the principal’s profits. Different from the existing
papers, especially those in management perspective, this study considers endorsers as
profit-maximising economic agents and they make optimal decisions just like con-
sumers and firms. In other words, the endorser’s behaviour is also taken as a vertical
endogenous variable. That means this study employs a three participants model:
Endorser–Producer–Consumer. Endorser decides whether to accept the product
endorsement invitation of the firms and which firm’s product to endorse following
the utility maximisation principle. Then, the firms decide their price and quantity
based on the behaviour of the endorser. Finally, the consumer chooses the product to
purchase based on his or her preference. Furthermore, this paper captures both the
direct effects and indirect effect by connecting marketing theory to industrial organ-
isation theory, which enriches the theory of celebrity endorsement and expands celeb-
rity endorsement application.
Management is good at investigating specific value of firms’ behaviour and eco-
nomics has the inherent advantage of revealing general rules. More importantly,
celebrity has both direct effects (e.g., purchase motivating & loyalty improving) and
indirect effects (e.g., price arising, rivals’ profit impacting & social welfare influence),
while most of the prior studies based on management only focused on the direct
impacts of endorsement. A possible reason for that is indirect effects is difficult to
capture in marketing practice. Besides revealing the direct influence of celebrity
endorsement, this paper aims to investigate its indirect effects by combining econom-
ics perspective with management. From the Match-Up Hypothesis, it learns that dif-
ferent product endorsement needs different celebrity choice. Generally, the more
special the products, the unique (means the most famous) the celebrity is needed.
That is why golf equipment industry prefers Tiger Woods and basketball industry
likes Michael Jordan as the endorsement celebrity (Derdenger, 2018). But fashion
product firms choose entertainment stars, while the pharmaceutical industry only
takes a guy wearing white coats to endorse its products (Kennedy, Baxter, & Ilicic,
2019). The more unique the endorser, the more monopolistic the endorser is. Thus,
this paper discusses both the monopolistic endorser and the competitive endorsers.
Monopolistic endorser means there is a unique endorser, while competitive indicates
two or more endorsers are available. First, this paper finds that celebrity endorsement
lowers rival’s benefits. Second, by measuring firm efficiency with marginal costs, this
study finds that under a unique endorser, lower efficiency firms’ celebrity endorse-
ment improves price difference and price dispersion.1 The higher-efficiency firm’s
endorsement promotes the producer surplus, consumer surplus and the social welfare.
Finally, under competitive endorsers, firms compete both in outputs and in celebrity
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endorsement. When one firm launches celebrity endorsement while the other does
not, it has the similar conclusions to those under a unique endorser, which means
the conclusions are robust.
This paper is organised as follows: Theory background is given in Section 2 and
the model is outlined in Section 3. Some analysis and the main results about the
unique endorser are presented in Section 4. The effects of endorsement are captured
with the unique endorser. Competitive endorsers are addressed in Section 5. The
effects of duopoly product endorsers are analysed and are compared with the unique
endorser. Then some conclusions and discussions are outlined in the final section.
2. Theory background
Modern product endorsements can come with contracts worth substantial amounts of
money. Many sport stars agree to participate in product endorsement campaigns with
the understanding that the company will compensate them for the trouble; some stars
donate the proceeds to charities they support, using product endorsement as a public
relations campaign. For example, TCL Corporation in China, a famous company with
TV and other family appliance products, signed Brazilian soccer star Ronaldo de
Assis Moreira for endorsement with 10 million euros in 2007 (http://www.tcl.com/
About/index.html). More interestingly, Celebrity Endorsement even was used in polit-
ical field by Politicians (Sikorski, Knoll, & Matthes, 2018).
Celebrities have been employed for product endorsement since the late nineteenth
century. Sherman (1985) gave an example from the early days of endorsement involv-
ing Queen Victoria in association with Cadbury’s Cocoa. According to Erdogan’s
view (1999), the emergence of papers, cinema and internet all greatly extends the
scope of endorsement as an advertising technique. Nicolau & Santa-Marıa (2013)
examined the relationship between two types of performances, one on the ground (of
a tennis court) and the other on the floor (of the stock market). Reed II, Forehand,
Puntoni, & Warlop (2012) developed the relationship between identity-based strat-
egies and consumer behaviours. Zamudio (2016) employed a two-sided matching
market model to capture the impacts of celebrity endorsement on consumers’ atti-
tudes and firm values.
Why is celebrity endorsement so popular and why can a person having nothing to
do with the company promote the product or service? Several theories are trying to
justify that and nearly all those theories hold the Product Match-Up Hypothesis
(Erdogan, 1999). Product Match-Up Hypothesis maintains the celebrity and the
endorsed brand should match-up each other and that means a matched celebrity can
succeed and vice versa. First, the Source Credibility Theory (SCT) shows consumer’s
beliefs, opinions, attitudes and behaviour can be influenced by the information deliv-
ered from the credible source (Saldanha, Mulye, & Rahman, 2018; Wang &
Scheinbaum, 2018). It learns from Desphands & Stayman (1994) that SCT is similar
to social identity theory for that it issues that the interactions between celebrity
endorser and consumers occurs because individuals trust people who have similar
attitudes and value structures to them.
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The Source Attractiveness Theory (SAT) contends consumers tend to form positive
stereotypes about those individuals who are famous and successful and they are more
likely to be famous and successful if they do as those successful individuals do
(Bergkvist & Zhou, 2016; Saldanha, Mulye, & Rahman, 2018). In other words, attract-
ive communicators are more helpful in changing beliefs and attractive endorsers cre-
ate more purchase intentions (Kahle & Homer, 1985). Solomon (1996) showed that
Performer Q (quotient) Ratings is a core concept of SAT, which reflects the celebrity’s
popularity among those who recognise the celebrity.
The Meaning Transfer Theory (MTT) is another famous theory about celebrity
endorsement. MTT contains three stages in meaning transfer, formation of celebrity
image, meaning transfers from celebrity to product and meaning transfer from prod-
uct to consumers (Knoll, Matthes, M€unch, & Ostermann, 2018; McCracken, 1988;
Scheidt, Gelhard, Strotzer, & Henseler, 2018). Benefits of celebrity endorsement are
marked, but the costs and risks of celebrity endorsement are also significant because
the endorsement fees are usually high and any stages of the meaning transfer can
turn out to be failed. News from Fortune show several celebrity endorsements that
enraged consumers, Such as Michael Jordan and Nike, Nicole Kidman and United
Arab Emirates’ Etihad Airways, Actor Alec Baldwin and Capital One Bank, and
so on.2
All the theories above based on marketing perspective were built upon psycho-
logical foundation. They are convenient to be used to explain the impact of celebrity
endorsement on purchase motivating. But this impact is difficult to be measured and
observed. Those celebrity endorsement theories mentioned above have fundamental
differences: SCT assumes that consumers can be influenced by people who have com-
mon features with themselves; SAT implies that people are more like to be influenced
by famous and successful one; while MTT shows that Meaning can be transferred
between different individuals and objects. Besides, Match-Up Hypothesis is the stron-
gest for MTT. Those theories are too microcosmic to reach common and robust con-
clusions. Furthermore, they are powerless on revealing the effects of celebrity on
equilibrium price, rivals’ strategies and social welfare, which are called indirect effects.
Nonprice competition is a major theory of Industrial organisation theory (Hatfield,
Plott, & Tanaka, 2016; 2012; Spence, 1977), and (celebrity endorsement) advertising is
a significant nonprice competition (Elliott & Lockard, 1996). Besides, Tirole (1988)’s
industrial organisation theory (IOT) showed that firm’s behaviours have strategic
effects which influence the behavior of the rivals. On the other hand, many studies
from IOT capture advertising behaviour, but few of them pay attention to celebrity
endorsement (Andre, 2016; Garthwaite, 2014). A possible reason is that celebrity
endorsement is a special type of advertising, while IOT just concerns with advertising.
Advertising is a meso-economics concept, while celebrity endorsement is a micro-eco-
nomics one. The issues that economics concerns are more macroscopic than manage-
ment. The reason for a firm to engage in celebrity endorsement is that it can transfer
meaning of the product from producer to consumer by celebrity endorsement adver-
tising. So, this study combines MTT of marketing theory with nonprice competition
theory of IOT to make a full frame of celebrity endorsement and purpose to obtain
some general conclusions.
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3. The model
Cournot quantity competition is a general model in industrial organisation (See Bian
et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2019; Sacco & Schmutzler, 2011; Tao, Wang, & Yang, 2018).
The model about celebrity endorsement is established here and the two firms are
assumed to abide Cournot quantity competition, which means they make quantity
decision by considering the action of the rival, simultaneously. In other words, this
paper employs a duopoly model to capture the celebrity competition based on indus-
trial organisation theory. There are many firms in nearly any industries, but most
industries are similar to oligopoly structure in reality because no products between
two firms are prefect substitutes. On the other hand, our conclusions can expand to
multi-competition market easily. So, duopoly competition model makes sense. Denote
the two firms by i 2 f1, 2g. The firms produce substitutable products and simultan-
eously select celebrity product endorsers. They compete both in quantity and in prod-
uct endorsement. Different from other articles, this paper considers product
endorsers as endogenous variables because they should make endorsing decisions
endogenously and our analyses begin with utility maximising consumers.
Consumers. From the industrial organisation theory (Chen, He, & Paudel, 2018;
Chen, Huang, Mishra, & Wang, 2018; Chen, Wen, Wang, & Nie, 2017; Sacco &
Schmutzler, 2011; Vives, 2008; Wang, Chen, & Nie, 2017), it assumes the representational
utility function of duopoly market is UðPi, pjÞ ¼ Aðqi þ qjÞ 12 q2i 12 q2jkqiqj without
considering any other factor besides quantity. Relevant study only needs to modify this
function based on the variable concerned. Source Attractiveness Theory (SAT) shows that
celebrity endorsement highlights consumer surplus and equilibrium prices, but none of
those studies model the effects of celebrity endorsement on utility and prices besides equi-
librium quantity.3 Following SAT and given the price vector of the two producers
p ¼ ðp1, p2Þ, the quantity vector q ¼ ðq1, q2Þ and the celebrity’s popularity (which is
attained by the technique of performer Q rating in Erdogan (1999) or Shimp







where k2½0,1 presents the product substitutability and the constant A>0 means
market capacity without product endorsement. k¼0 means that goods are independ-
ent and k¼1 manifests perfect substitutes (Chen, Chen, & Mishra, 2019; Chen, Wan,
& Wang, 2015; Liu et al., 2012; Nie, 2012; Nie, Wang, Chen, & Chen, 2018; Nie &
Chen, 2012; Nie & Wang, 2018; Raykov & Calantone, 2014). According to (1), the
celebrity product endorsement improves the corresponding market size efficiently,
which affects the firm’s other strategies, including price, outputs and so on.
Furthermore, this paper assumes that the product message and celebrity information
are perfect match-up.5 Therefore, the match-up degree is not focused in this work.
For i, j 2 f1, 2g and i 6¼ j, the corresponding inverse demand function is induced
by (1), which is presented as
pi ¼ Að1þ xiÞqikqj: (2)
From (2), qi increases with xi while decreases with xj. This means that product
endorsement can improve the corresponding demand and reduce the rival’s demand.
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The product endorsement has expansionary effects on the demand and crowding-out
effects on rivals. Similarly, product endorsement promotes the price of the corre-
sponding products while reduces the rival’s price.
Product Endorser. Here, behaviour of the product endorser is addressed. The value
of the product endorsement is pe, which is independent of the quantity of products.
Moreover, denote uðxÞ to be the opportunity cost of the endorser with the celebrity’s
popularity x. uðxÞ is convex and duðxÞdx >0. Furthermore, it is assumed that uðxÞ ¼ 12 x2.
Only when the following constraints are met, the product endorser appears6
peuðxÞ  0: (3)
This is also called the participation constraint.
Producers. The profits of firms are presented as follows. For i 2 f1, 2g,
pi ¼ piqiciqipei, (4)
where pei is the cost incurred by the product endorsement independent of the quan-
tity of products or it is a type of transfer. ci is the marginal cost independent of the
product endorsement and qi represents the outputs of firm i 2 f1, 2g. This paper
addresses asymmetrical efficiency situation in which the two firms have different mar-
ginal costs which measure the efficiencies of firms. Without loss of generality, this
paper stipulates c1<c2 throughout. Or, the first (high efficiency) firm owns the cost
advantage compared with the second (low efficiency) firm.
Firm i 2 f1, 2g maximises its profits by pei, qri and qi. According to (2) and (3),
the profit function is concave both in pei and qi. A unique solution for the above sys-
tem exists. Moreover, the above functions are all consistent with the assumption
about quality commitment in Reitzes (1992).
The above model is analysed in two cases. One is the monopoly product endorser,
called monopolistic endorser-competitive principals-model, in which one firm
launches the product endorsement while the other does not. In this case, the unique
product endorser plays the monopolisation position. The other is the duopoly prod-
uct endorsers, known as competitive endorsers-competitive principals-model, in
which two firms may simultaneously launch the product endorsing.7
Here the benchmark model without product endorsement orpe1 ¼ pe2 ¼ 0 is intro-
duced. The equilibrium outputs, equilibrium price, equilibrium profits and social wel-
fare based on (2) and (4) are
qb, 1 ¼
2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ





pb, 1 ¼ A
ð2k2ÞðAc1Þ þ kðAc2Þ











ðqb, 1 Þ2 þ
3
2
ðqb, 2 Þ2kqb, 1 qb, 2
¼
½3 2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ½ 2 þ 3 2ðAc2ÞkðAc1Þ½ 2
2k 2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ½  2ðAc2ÞkðAc1Þ½ 
2ð4k2Þ2 :
(5)
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The equilibrium of the benchmark model is employed to compare with other con-
clusions under product endorsement.
4. Monopoly product endorser
For the unique product endorser, the herein model is analysed. In this case, it
assumes that uðxÞ ¼ x22 ¼ c0. For the unique product endorser with the celebrity
popularity x, this product endorser plays the monopoly position. The model will be
discussed based on two different cases. One is that the first firm launches product
endorsement and the other is that the second firm employs product endorsement. In
these two cases, the product endorser plays the leading position.
4.1. High-efficient firm having product endorsement
The first firm launches while the second firm does not make product endorsement. In
this case, pe2 ¼ 0 and pe1  0. This endorser meets the participation constraint as the fol-
lowing problem
pe1  c0: (6)
The profit functions of the two producers are restated as follows.
Max
q1
p1 ¼ Að1þ xÞq1kq2
 
q1c1q1pe1




p2 ¼ ðAq2kq1Þq2c2q2: (8)
The lower-level problem (7)-(8) is concave. Therefore, a unique solution for the
lower-level problem exists, which is determined by the first order optimal conditions.
The first optimal conditions of the lower-level problem imply
@p1
@q1
¼ Að1þ xÞ2q1kq2c1 ¼ 0, (9)
@p2
@q2
¼ A2q2kq1c2 ¼ 0: (10)
Denote the solution to be ðqm1, 1 , qm1, 2 Þ. (6)-(10) imply that
qm1, 1 ¼
2ðAþ xc1ÞkðAc2Þ
4 k2 , (11)
qm1, 2 ¼
2ðAc2ÞkðAþ xc1Þ
4 k2 : (12)
The quantity of products and the price of product endorsement all decrease with
the corresponding cost while increase with the rival’s cost. The profits are determined
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by the expressions pm11 ¼ ½2ðAþxc1ÞkðAc2Þ4k2 
2pe1 and pm12 ¼ ½2ðAc2ÞkðAþxc1Þ4k2 
2.
Moreover, for the endorser, the endorsement transfer is pem1, 1 satisfying the relation-
ship pm11 pb1 ¼ 0. Or pem1, 1 ¼ 4 x4k2
 2 þ 4x½2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ
4k2 
2. It points out that
pem1, 1  x22. (If pem1, 1 <x22, the unique endorser has no intention to act as
an endorser.)
The profits of the two firms are pm11 ¼ ½2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ4k2 
2
and pm12 ¼ ½2ðAc2ÞkðAc1Þ4k2 
2 þ k2 x
4k2
 2 2ðAc2ÞkðAc1Þð4k2Þ2 2kx:
The social welfare (SW) is the consumer surplus (CS) plus the producer surplus as
well as the endorser surplus. The above analysis implies that product endorsement
hurts producer surplus but improves consumer surplus.
SWm1 ¼ CSm1 þ PSm1 þ pem1, 1 c0 ¼
3
2
ðqm1, 1 Þ2 þ
3
2
ðqm1, 2 Þ2kqm1, 1 qm1, 2 c0
¼ 1
2ð4k2Þ2 f3 2ðAþ xc1ÞkðAc2Þ½ 
2 þ 3 2ðAc2ÞkðAþ xc1Þ½ 2
2k 2ðAþ xc1ÞkðAc2Þ½  2ðAc2ÞkðAþ xc1Þ½ gc0:
(13)
The term pem1, 1 c0 represents the utility of the endorser. Moreover, c2>c1 implies
qm1, 1 qm1, 2 ¼
ð2þ kÞðxþ c2c1Þ
4 k2 >0: (14)
Furthermore, qm1, 1 qm1, 2 >qb, 1 qb, 2 >0, qm1, 1 þ qm1, 2 >qb, 1 þ qb, 2 , qm1, 1 >qb, 1 and
qm1, 2 <q
b, 
2 . The first firm launching endorsement enlarges output difference and
improves the total demand.
Further denote the prices to be
ðpm1, 1 , pm1, 2 Þ ¼ ðAð1þ xÞ
ð2k2ÞðAþ xc1Þ þ kðAc2Þ
4 k2 ,
Að2k
2ÞðAc2Þ þ kðAþ xc1Þ
4 k2 Þ:
(2)






2 . Similar to Nie and Chen
(2012), this paper addresses price dispersion. Price dispersion means the relative price
difference. Denote the price dispersion to be gm1 ¼ jp
m1, 
1 pm1, 2 j
pm1, 1 þpm1, 2
. For the benchmark
problem, it has gb ¼ jp
b, 
1 pb, 2 j
pb, 1 þpb, 2
.
4.2. Low efficient firm launching product endorsement
The second firm launches while the first firm does not make product endorsement.
In this case, pe2>0 and pe1 ¼ 0. This endorser maximises the following problem
Max pe2
S:t: pe2  c0 : (15)
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The profit functions of the two producers are restated as follows.
Max
q1
p1 ¼ ðAq1kq2Þq1c1q1, (16)
Max
q2
p2 ¼ Að1þ xÞq2kq1
 
q2c2q2pe2
S:t: p2  pb2:
(17)
This constitutes a Stackelberg game. The lower-level problem is also concave. The
first optimal conditions of the lower-level problem imply
@p1
@q1
¼ A2q1kq2c1 ¼ 0, (18)
@p2
@q2
¼ Að1þ xÞ2q2kq1c2 ¼ 0: (19)
Denote the solution to be ðqm2, 1 , qm2, 2 Þ. (15)-(19) imply the following
qm2, 1 ¼
2ðAc1ÞkðAþ xc2Þ
4 k2 , (20)
qm2, 2 ¼
2ðAþ xc2ÞkðAc1Þ
4 k2 : (21)
The quantity of products and the price of product endorsement all decrease with
the corresponding cost while increase with the rival’s cost. The profits are corres-
pondingly determined by the expression pm21 ¼ ½2ðAc1ÞkðAþxc2Þ4k2 
2 and
pm12 ¼ ½2ðAþxc2ÞkðAc1Þ4k2 
2pe2. Moreover, the endorsement transfer is pem2, 2 satisfying
the relationship pm2, 2 pb, 2 ¼ 0. Or pem2, 2 ¼ 4 x4k2
 2 þ 4x½2ðAc2ÞkðAc1Þ
4k2 . this paper
also points out that pem2, 2  x
2








2 , firm with
low efficiency has no motivation to launch product endorsement.










Again, the social welfare is the consumer surplus plus the producer surplus and
the endorser’s utility.
SWm2 ¼ CSm2 þ PSm2 þ pem2, 2 c0 ¼
3
2
ðqm2, 1 Þ2 þ
3
2
ðqm2, 2 Þ2kqm2, 1 qm2, 2 c0
¼ 1
2ð4k2Þ2 f3 2ðAc1ÞkðAþ xc2Þ½ 
2 þ 3 2ðAþ xc2ÞkðAc1Þ½ 2
2k 2ðAc1ÞkðAþ xc2Þ½  2ðAþ xc2ÞkðAc1Þ½ gc0:
(22)
The term pem2, 2 c0 is the endorser’s utility. It has qm2, 1 þ qm2, 2 ¼ qm1, 1 þ qm1, 2 ,
jqm2, 1 qm2, 2 j<jqm1, 1 qm1, 2 j, qm2, 1 <qm1, 1 and qm2, 2 >qm1, 2 . Moreover, the output dif-
ference is also denoted as follows:
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qm2, 1 qm2, 2 ¼
ð2þ kÞðc2c1xÞ
4 k2 : (23)
The sign of the above expression depends on parameters, including cost difference







2 . Moreover, q
m2, 
1 þ qm2, 2 ¼ qm1, 1 þ qm1, 2 implies
pm2, 1 þ pm2, 2 ¼ pm1, 1 þ pm1, 2 . Price dispersion is gm2 ¼ jp
m2, 
1 pm2, 2 j
pm2, 1 þpm2, 2
. For the outputs
and price, this paper has the following conclusion
Proposition 1. Under the unique endorser, price difference and price dispersion
with the lower efficiency firm launching endorsement are all larger than those
under the higher efficiency firm’s launching endorsement. Moreover, gm2>gb.
Proof: See in Appendix. 
Remarks: Firm’s endorsement improves the price of the corresponding products. If
the higher efficiency firm launches product endorsement, the price difference reduces.
If the lower efficiency firm has product endorsement, the price difference increases.
The endorsement has brand effects and this yields the above conclusions. The main
conclusion of proposition 1 shows that production efficiency has important impact
on product endorsement behaviour and high-efficiency firm has more motivation to
engage in product endorsement innovation.
Considering the profit functions under the above two cases, this paper has the fol-
lowing conclusion.
Proposition 2. Under the unique endorser, product endorsement does not bring the
firm any direct benefit but it decreases the profits of the rivals. This unique endorser
would like to endorse for the high-efficiency firm. When the endorser has better
celebrity, the firm without endorsement incurs a greater loss. Furthermore, profits
satisfy the relationship pb1 ¼ pm11 >pm21 and pb2 ¼ pm22 >pm12 .
Proof: See in Appendix. 
Remarks: Under the unique endorser, endorsement increases the output of the
endorsed firm. When the higher-efficiency firm launches endorsement, the extra prof-
its are larger than that when the lower efficiency firm has endorsement. All the extra
profits are taken by the endorser because he/she is the monopolistic endorsement
offer. Therefore, the endorser would like to act as the endorser of the higher-effi-
ciency firm. Proposition 1 implies that firm would prefer to launch endorsement
advertising even if it brings the firm with no direct benefit because endorsement has
strategy effects of reduce rival’s profit. This conclusion cannot obtain by those studies
based on management or marketing perspective, which partly explains why this study
is valuable to be carry out.
Here this paper compares the social welfare under the above two cases. The follow-
ing conclusion holds. qm2, 1 þ qm2, 2 ¼ qm1, 1 þ qm1, 2 and jqm2, 1 qm2, 2 j<jqm1, 1 qm1, 2 j
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Therefore, the following conclusion is adhered.
Proposition 3. Under the unique endorser condition, the consumer surplus and the
producer surplus of the first case are all larger than those of the second case.
Moreover, SWm2<SWb and SWm2<SWm1. With small c0, celebrity endorsement
improves social welfare. Otherwise, celebrity endorsement reduces social welfare.
Proof: See in appendix. 
Remarks: The higher-efficiency firm’s endorsement yields larger price difference,
larger consumer surplus and larger producer surplus. The first firm’s endorsement
improves the social welfare correspondingly. Celebrity endorsement improves con-
sumer surplus, while reduces producer surplus. Taking the cost of celebrity endorse-
ment, the above conclusions are achieved.
5. Duopoly product endorsements
Here it discusses the situation with two product endorsers.8 Three cases are
addressed: the first case is that the first (high efficiency) firm launches endorsement
while the second (low efficiency) one does not; the second is the reverse meaning
that the second firm has endorsement while the first firm does not; and the third
case is that the two firms simultaneously choose their own product endorsement. It
points out that the first case and the second case are different from section 3 because
the endorsers are competitive in this section, so they do not have enough power to
take all the extra profits resulting from endorsement. In this case, the maximum value
of the endorser is equal to its opportunity costs or pei ¼ uðxiÞ ¼ 12 x2i . Two endorsers
are different in performer Q rating and value. High-efficient producer prefers the
high-value endorser and the high Q rating endorser likes to endorse for high-effi-
cient firm.
5.1. The first firm uniquely launching endorsement
In this case, pe2 ¼ 0 while pe1>0. The profit functions are restated
Max
q1, qr1





p2 ¼ ðAq2kq1Þq2c2q2: (25)
p1 is concave in q1 and qr1, and p2 is concave in q2. This implies the existence of a
unique solution and this unique solution is determined by the first order optimal
conditions. The first optimal conditions of the lower-level problem imply
@p1
@q1
¼ Að1þ x1Þ2q1kq2c1 ¼ 0, (26)
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@p1
@qr1
¼ Aq1x1 ¼ 0, (27)
@p2
@q2
¼ A2q2kq1c2 ¼ 0: (28)
The equilibrium solution of (26)-(28) is
qc1, 1 ¼
2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ




4 2A2  k2 ,
xc1, 1 ¼ A
2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ




4 2A2  k2 k
ðAc2Þ
4 2A2  k2 ,
pc1, 2 ¼ A
ð2A2k2ÞðAc2Þ
4 2A2  k2 k
ðAc1Þ














(29) implies pc1, 1 pc1, 2 ¼ ð2A2k2kÞ ðc1c2Þ42A2k2 þ
A2ðAc1Þ
42A2k2. The sign of price differ-
ence mainly depends on the cost difference and parameter A. Denote the price dis-
persion to be gc1 ¼ jp
c1, 
1 pc1, 2 j
pc1, 1 þpc1, 2
and the corresponding social welfare to be
SWc1 ¼ CSc1 þ PSc1 þ pec1, 1  ðqr
c1, 
1 Þ2
2 ¼ 32 ðqc1, 1 Þ2 þ 32 ðqc1, 2 Þ2kqc1, 1 qc1, 2 
ðxc1, 1 Þ2
2 and the
term pec1, 1  ðx
c1, 
1 Þ2
2 is the endorser’s utility.
5.2. The second firm uniquely launching endorsement
In this case, pe2>0 while pe1 ¼ 0. The profit functions are rewritten as
Max
q1
p1 ¼ ðAq1kq2Þq1c1q1, (30)
Max
q2, qr2
p2 ¼ Að1þ x2Þq2kq1
 
q2c2q2uðx2Þ: (31)
The equilibrium solution of (30)-(31) is
qc2, 1 ¼
ð2A2ÞðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ




4 2A2  k2 ,
xc2, 2 ¼ A
2ðAc2ÞkðAc1Þ




4 2A2  k2 k
ðAc2Þ
4 2A2  k2 ,
pc2, 2 ¼ A
ð2k22A2ÞðAc2Þ
4 2A2  k2 k
ðAc1Þ
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From (32), it has pc2, 1 pc2, 2 ¼ ð2A2k2kÞ ðc1c2Þ42A2k2 
A2ðAc2Þ
42A2k2. By (32) and (29),
this paper obtains qc1, 1 þ qc1, 2 >qc2, 1 þ qc2, 2 . Denote gc2 ¼ jp
c2, 
1 pc2, 2 j
pc2, 1 þpc2, 2
. Further denote
the social SWc2 ¼ CSc2 þ PSc2 þ pec2, 2  ðx
c2, 
2 Þ2









2 is the endorser’s utility. Comparing (29) and (32),
it has




















Proof. See in Appendix. 
Remarks: Product endorsement improves the brand and the price of the correspond-
ing product, which is common conclusion. However, proposition 4 shows that high
efficiency has more motivation to launch product endorsement again. Empirical evi-
dence is that leading enterprise are more like to engage in endorsement advertising
in reality. This yields the similar conclusions as monopoly condition of section 4,
which illustrates the conclusions are robust.
5.3. Two firms making endorsement
In this case, the two firms simultaneously launch product endorsement. pe2>0 and
pe1>0. The profits are
Max
q1, qr1





p2 ¼ Að1þ x2Þq2kq1
 
q2c2q2uðx2Þ: (34)
The corresponding equilibrium solution is
qc3, 1 ¼
ð2A2ÞðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ




ð2A2Þ2  k2 ,
xc3, 1 ¼ A
ð2A2ÞðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ




ð2A2Þ2  k2 ,






ð2A2Þ2  k2 k
ðAc2Þ
ð2A2Þ2  k2 ,






ð2A2Þ2  k2 k
ðAc1Þ
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By (35), xc3, 1 >x
c3, 
2 . Similarly, the social welfare under this case is presented as fol-
lows: SWc3 ¼ 32 ðqc3, 1 Þ2 þ 32 ðqc3, 2 Þ2kqc3, 1 qc3, 2 
ðxc3, 2 Þ2þðxc3, 1 Þ2
2 . Comparing the above
three cases in this section, this paper gets the following conclusions



















1 ¼ pm11 >pc21 , pc12 <pc32 <pc22 and pc22 >pb2 ¼ pm12 >pc12 .
Proof: See in appendix. 
Remarks: Under competitive endorsers, the two firms fiercely compete both in
endorsement and in quantity. The output difference is reduced. Firms are impacted
by rival’s celebrity endorsement. When firm launches celebrity endorsement, the rival
would correspondingly do celebrity endorsement to improve the profits. Compared
with pm11 ¼ pb1, the extra profits from celebrity endorsement under competitive
endorsers are earned by the one-sided endorsement firm. However, the relationship
between pb1 and p
c3




2 ) seems indeterminate.
Proposition 5 illustrates that celebrity endorsement increases firms’ quantity and prof-
its and high-efficiency firm has higher motivation to launches product endorsement
than the less efficiency one. More importantly, if one firm engages in product
endorsement, the best reaction for the rival is to launch product endorsement, too. In
other words, product endorsement has trigger effects, which is an important issue
in IOT.
6. Conclusions and discussions
Celebrity endorsement is a common competition strategy especially for manufacturers
such as perfumes and clothing producers. Many attentions about endorsement have
been paid to the Business to Consumer (B2C) sector based on management, but
more studies should be offered to the Business to Business (B2B) sector from indus-
trial perspective because celebrity endorsement is far more than purchase motivating.
Besides purchase motivating, celebrity endorsement has strategic effects to inhibit
rival’s quantity and profits and, has significant influence on social welfare. However,
those effects are more convenient to be captured by economics perspective. So, by
combining industrial organisation theory with marketing theory and using a triple
consumer-endorser-producer model, this article captures both the direct and indirect
effects of celebrity endorsement strategy. And this study addresses the product
endorsement under duopoly both for the unique endorser and for duopoly endorsers.
Under those two cases, output difference, price difference, price dispersion and social
welfare are all compared. This paper finds that celebrity endorsement improves brand
while hurts rivals’ profits. More importantly, celebrity endorsement strategies under
different conditions have different influence to social welfare.
The policy implications of the conclusions above are outlined as follows. For the
celebrities, they should take the social welfare influence into account when they make
their endorsement decision, but not only their own income maximisation. For the
producer or the managers, they should notice the reactions of the rivals and the char-
acteristic of the endorsers. For example, the best reaction for the less efficient
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producer is to make endorsement investment as the higher efficient rival do, while it
should not trigger endorsement competition if its efficient rival does not engage
celebrity endorsement. Lastly, the government could motivate more efficient firms to
choose endorsement strategy because it improves the social welfare. Firms can take
the conclusions of this paper as a guideline to make endorsement competition after
they realise the indirect influence of endorsement. Endorsers will learn from this art-
icle on when and whom they should endorse for by knowing more about the influen-
ces of their endorsement behaviour. And this article is also helpful for regulators to
improve the social welfare based on celebrity endorsement.
The limitation of this study is that it takes celebrity behaviour as an endogenous
variable, but little attention has been paid to celebrity’s choice. For example, this
paper does not consider celebrity’s characteristic and preference, which may have sig-
nificant effect on his or her endorsement choices. Besides, this paper does not employ
monopolistic firm condition and only considers Cournot quantity competition, while
other competition condition such as Stacklberg has considerable influence on product
endorsement strategy. Some relationships are not obtained because they are ambigu-
ous. These uncertainties come from cost difference, performer Q rating and other fac-
tors. Further studies can take the imperfect match-up hypothesis and endorsement
uncertainties into consideration because some studies show characteristics changes or
negative associations of celebrity endorsers influence celebrity endorsement and weak
support for the match-up hypothesis. Besides, our further studies will endow endorse-
ment failure a probability and consider the interaction between the producer and
the endorser.
Notes
1. Firm’s efficiency is generally measured by marginal costs in economics-oriented studies,
especially in industrial organisation (Chen, Nie & Wang, 2015; Chen, Wen & Luo, 2016;
Sacco & Schmutzler, 2011; Vives, 2008), and so as this paper.
2. FORTUNE: http://fortune.com/2015/04/19/celebrity-endorsements-gone-wrong/.
3. On one hand, the value of celebrity endorsement is that it promotes perchance by raising
consumers’ utility. On the other hand, celebrity endorsement is costly and all the
expenditure should be reclaimed by higher prices and consumers increasing.
4. Performer Q Rating was first issued in Solomon (1996)’ famous book named Consumer
Behavior and then Shimp (1997) calculated celebrity’s Q rating by questionnaire and Q
equals to the percentage of sample who know the celebrity divided the percentage of the
total sample rating the celebrity as ‘one of the favorites’, which measured the attractiveness
of the celebrity.
5. Search costs of celebrity are ex-ante expenditure called sunk costs, which do not influence
firm decision in economics perspective. And this study will ignore the fail endorsement
cases, so we hold on the perfect match-up assumption.
6. Opportunity cost is a major concept in economics and which is different from accounting
cost because you do not need to pay this cost but it influences individual’s decision.
7. The difference between the two models is that in the former the endorser makes decision
without rival, while in the latter both the endorsers and producers make choices under
competitive condition.
8. Conclusions under multiple endorsers are almost the same as the duopoly model.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. It first considers the price difference.
pm1, 1 pm1, 2 ¼ Ax
ð2k2 þ kÞðxþ c2c1Þ
4 k2 ,
pm2, 2 pm2, 1 ¼ Ax
ð2k2 þ kÞðxþ c1c2Þ
4 k2 :
c2>c1 implies jpm1, 1 pm1, 2 j<jpm2, 2 pm2, 1 j. pm2, 1 þ pm2, 2 ¼ pm1, 1 þ pm1, 2 implies the relation-










2 jointly imply g
m2>gb.
Conclusion is achieved and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For the unique endorser, it has pm11 ¼ pb1, pm12 <pb2, pm22 ¼ pb2 and
pm21 <p
b
1. It therefore has that product endorsement does not bring the firm any direct benefit
but it decreases the profits of the rival’s.
c2>c1 indicates epm1, >epm2, . The endorser earns more from the higher-efficiency firm.





ox <0 imply that when the endorser has better celebrity, the firm without
endorsement undertakes a more loss. The relationship pb1 ¼ pm11 >pm21 and pb2 ¼ pm22 >pm12
seems obvious.
Conclusion is attained and the proof is complete. 
Proof of Proposition 3. CSm2<CSm1 and PSm2<PSm1 imply SWm2<SWm1. By comparing
SWm1, SWm2 and SW0,
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SWm1SW0 ¼ 1
2ð4k2Þ2 f3 2ðAþ xc1ÞkðAc2Þ½ 
2 þ 3 2ðAc2ÞkðAþ xc1Þ½ 2
2k 2ðAþ xc1ÞkðAc2Þ½  2ðAc2ÞkðAþ xc1Þ½ gc0
3 2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ½ 2 þ 3 2ðAc2ÞkðAc1Þ½ 22k 2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ½  2ðAc2ÞkðAc1Þ½ 
2ð4k2Þ2 :
SWm2SW0 ¼ 1
2ð4k2Þ2 f3 2ðAþ xc2ÞkðAc1Þ½ 
2 þ 3 2ðAc1ÞkðAþ xc2Þ½ 2
2k 2ðAþ xc2ÞkðAc1Þ½  2ðAc1ÞkðAþ xc2Þ½ gc0
3 2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ½ 2 þ 3 2ðAc2ÞkðAc1Þ½ 22k 2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ½  2ðAc2ÞkðAc1Þ½ 
2ð4k2Þ2 :
It immediately knows that under small c0, celebrity endorsement improves social welfare.
Otherwise, celebrity endorsement reduces social welfare.
Conclusion is attained and the proof is complete. 









2 are derived from A







xc1, 1 xc3, 1 ¼ A
2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ




¼ 2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ½  A
3ð2A2Þ
ð4 2A2  k2Þ ð2A2Þ2  k2
 þ A3ðAc1Þ 1ð2A2Þ2  k2
¼ A2f 2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ½  ð2A
2Þ
ð4 2A2  k2Þ ð2A2Þ2  k2
 þ ðAc1Þ 1ð2A2Þ2  k2g
¼ A
3
ð4 2A2  k2Þ ð2A2Þ2  k2
  kðAc2Þð2A2ÞðAc1Þk2 >0:










2 are therefore achieved.
From (29) and (32), it has jpc2, 1 pc2, 2 j>jpc1, 1 pc1, 2 j. Moreover,
pc2, 1 þ pc2, 2 ¼ 2A
ð2A2k2kÞðAc1Þ
4 2A2  k2 
ð22A2k2kÞðAc2Þ
4 2A2  k2
¼ 2Að2A
2k2kÞ ðAc1Þ þ ðAc2Þ½ 
4 2A2  k2 þ
A2ðAc2Þ
4 2A2  k2
<2Að2A
2k2kÞ ðAc1Þ þ ðAc2Þ½ 
4 2A2  k2 þ
A2ðAc1Þ
4 2A2  k2 ¼ p
c1, 
1 þ pc1, 2 :
Therefore, gc2>gc1. Conclusion is attained and the proof is complete. 







(29) and (35), the following holds.
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qc1, 1 qc3, 1 ¼
2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ
4 2A2  k2 
ð2A2ÞðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ
ð2A2Þ2  k2
¼ kðAc2Þð2A2Þ2  k2 
kðAc2Þ
2ð2 A2Þ  k2
" #
þ ðAc1Þ 2




¼ kðAc2Þð2A2Þ2  k2 
kðAc2Þ








ð4 2A2  k2Þ ð2A2Þ2  k2
  ¼ kA2 qc3, 2ð4 2A2  k2Þ>0:




1 . Similarly, this paper immediately




















































 2 f2A2 ð2A2Þ2k2 ð2A2Þ þ A2 42A2k2½ k2g>0:






















ðqc1, 1 qc3, 1 Þ>0:
























4 2A2  k2 
4ðAc1Þ2kðAc2Þ

















4 2A2  k2 >0:
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¼ 2ðAc1ÞkðAc2Þ½ 2 A
2
2
4ð42A2k2 þ 4k2Þ þ ð4k2Þ2
ð4k2Þ2ð42A2k2Þ2 <0:
The inequality holds because of 42A2k2 þ 4k2>4k2 and 4k2<4.this paper there-





















2 . Conclusions are attained and the proof is complete. 
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